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Kernova

Built-in Tools

Kernova ships twelve built-in tools. The safe ones are registered automatically when the kernel starts. Tools that run code or touch the file system or a database are off by default: a prompt injection in any page, file, or message an agent reads can make the model call any tool it has, so enable those only for agents whose input you trust.

Agents can invoke tools in two ways:

PatternMethodWho Decides
Automatictools.completeWithTools()The LLM decides which tools to call
Directtools.useTool(id, params)Your code decides explicitly

The Twelve Built-in Tools

IDDefaultDescription
http-fetchOnMake HTTP requests (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH). Private and internal addresses are blocked
date-timeOnGet current date, time, timezone, and formatting
json-parseOnParse JSON with dot-path extraction and transforms
math-evalOnSafe math expression evaluation (no eval())
regex-matchOnPattern matching and replacement, with a hard timeout
image-describeOnDescribe images using a vision-capable model
web-searchWhen configuredSearch the web; offered only when you set webSearchProvider
file-readOffRead files inside the sandbox directory
file-writeOffWrite or append to files inside the sandbox directory
shell-execOffExecute shell commands (not a sandbox, see below)
code-evalOffRun JavaScript in an isolated process with a timeout
database-queryOffRead-only SQL queries against a SQLite database you specify

The off-by-default IDs are exported as UNSAFE_BUILT_IN_TOOLS, the defaults as DEFAULT_BUILT_IN_TOOLS.

How They’re Registered

During kernel.start(), the BuiltInToolRegistry applies the enabled/disabled configuration and registers the remaining tools into the PluginRegistry as one internal plugin.

kernel.start()
  → BuiltInToolRegistry applies enabled/disabled filtering
  → Registers enabled tools into PluginRegistry
  → Kernel ready

Tool policies (KernelConfig.toolPolicy and toolPolicy in defineAgent()) can narrow the set further per agent.

Configuration

Control which tools are available and how they behave via BuiltInToolConfig:

interface BuiltInToolConfig {
  enabled?: string[];       // Whitelist: only these tools (default: DEFAULT_BUILT_IN_TOOLS)
  disabled?: string[];      // Blacklist: removed even if enabled
  sandboxDir?: string;      // Root for file tools and shell cwd (default: <dataDir>/workspace)
  shellTimeout?: number;    // shell-exec timeout and maximum, in ms (default: 30000)
  shellEnv?: Record<string, string>;  // Extra environment variables for shell-exec
  codeEvalTimeout?: number; // code-eval timeout and maximum, in ms (default: 5000)
  databasePath?: string;    // SQLite file for database-query (required for that tool)
  webSearchProvider?: WebSearchProvider; // Backend for web-search
  httpFetch?: {
    allowPrivateNetwork?: boolean; // Allow localhost/private/link-local targets (default: false)
    maxResponseBytes?: number;     // Truncate longer bodies (default: 1,000,000)
    timeoutMs?: number;            // Timeout and maximum, in ms (default: 30000)
  };
}

Timeouts are ceilings: the model can ask for a shorter timeout, never a longer one.

Via KernovaKernel (Core)

import { KernovaKernel, DEFAULT_BUILT_IN_TOOLS } from '@kernova/core';


const kernel = new KernovaKernel({
  environment: 'development',
  builtInTools: {
    // Keep the defaults and add file access, confined to ./workspace
    enabled: [...DEFAULT_BUILT_IN_TOOLS, 'file-read', 'file-write'],
    sandboxDir: './workspace',
  },
});

Via SDK

import { Kernova } from '@kernova/sdk';


const app = await Kernova.create({
  builtInTools: {
    enabled: ['http-fetch', 'date-time', 'file-read'],
    sandboxDir: './data',
  },
});

Tool: http-fetch

Make HTTP requests to external APIs, webhooks, or any URL.

ID: http-fetch

Parameters

ParamTypeRequiredDefaultDescription
urlstringYes—URL to fetch
methodstringNo'GET'HTTP method (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH)
headersobjectNo{}HTTP headers
bodystringNo—Request body (only sent for POST/PUT/PATCH)
timeoutnumberNo30000Timeout in ms

Returns

On success:

{
  status: 200,
  statusText: 'OK',
  headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', ... },
  body: '{"login":"kernova","id":12345,...}'
}

On failure:

{
  error: true,
  message: 'Request timeout after 30000ms'
}

Error Handling

Network errors and timeouts return an error object — they never throw. This means the LLM sees the error message in context and can decide how to recover (retry, try a different URL, or report the failure to the user).

Network Safety

The URL comes from the model, so by default http-fetch refuses:

  • Hosts that resolve to loopback, private, link-local, or other internal addresses, including the cloud metadata service at 169.254.169.254
  • Redirects to such addresses (every hop is checked)
  • Protocols other than http and https

Responses larger than maxResponseBytes (default 1,000,000) are cut off and marked truncated: true. To call services on your own network, set builtInTools.httpFetch.allowPrivateNetwork: true.

Examples

// Simple GET request
const result = await tools.useTool('http-fetch', {
  url: 'https://api.github.com/repos/kernova/core',
});


console.log(JSON.parse(result.body).stargazers_count);
// POST with headers and JSON body
const result = await tools.useTool('http-fetch', {
  url: 'https://api.example.com/data',
  method: 'POST',
  headers: {
    'Content-Type': 'application/json',
    'Authorization': 'Bearer sk-...',
  },
  body: JSON.stringify({ name: 'test', value: 42 }),
});


if (result.error) {
  console.error('Request failed:', result.message);
} else {
  console.log('Created:', result.status); // 201
}
// DELETE with custom timeout
const result = await tools.useTool('http-fetch', {
  url: 'https://api.example.com/records/123',
  method: 'DELETE',
  headers: { 'Authorization': 'Bearer sk-...' },
  timeout: 5000,
});

Tool: file-read

Read files from the sandboxed filesystem.

ID: file-read

Parameters

ParamTypeRequiredDefaultDescription
pathstringYes—File path relative to sandbox
encodingstringNo'utf-8'Encoding (utf-8, base64, hex)

Returns

{
  path: 'config/settings.json',
  content: '{"theme":"dark","lang":"en"}',
  size: 28
}

Sandbox Enforcement

The path is resolved relative to sandboxDir. Any attempt to traverse outside the sandbox is blocked:

// ✓ Valid — resolves to {sandboxDir}/config/settings.json
await tools.useTool('file-read', { path: 'config/settings.json' });


// ✓ Valid — resolves to {sandboxDir}/data.txt
await tools.useTool('file-read', { path: './data.txt' });


// ✗ BLOCKED — path traversal detected
await tools.useTool('file-read', { path: '../../etc/passwd' });
// → throws SandboxViolationError

The check works on whole path segments, so a sibling folder such as workspace-private is outside a workspace sandbox. Symbolic links and junctions are followed, and a link that leads outside the sandbox is blocked too.

Errors

ConditionBehavior
File not foundThrows with clear message: File not found: reports/q4.csv
Permission deniedThrows with OS-level error
Path traversalThrows SandboxViolationError (code: 'SANDBOX_VIOLATION')

Example

// Read a JSON config
const { content } = await tools.useTool('file-read', { path: 'config.json' });
const config = JSON.parse(content);


// Read a binary file as base64
const { content: b64 } = await tools.useTool('file-read', {
  path: 'images/logo.png',
  encoding: 'base64',
});

Tool: file-write

Write or append content to files in the sandboxed filesystem.

ID: file-write

Parameters

ParamTypeRequiredDefaultDescription
pathstringYes—File path relative to sandbox
contentstringYes—Content to write
encodingstringNo'utf-8'Encoding (utf-8, base64, hex)
appendbooleanNofalseAppend instead of overwrite

Returns

{
  path: 'output/report.md',
  bytesWritten: 1024,
  append: false,
  success: true
}

Behavior

  • Overwrite (default): Replaces the file if it exists, creates it if it doesn’t.
  • Append: Adds content to the end of an existing file, or creates a new file.
  • Auto-mkdir: Parent directories are created automatically (like mkdir -p). Writing to reports/2025/q3/summary.md creates all intermediate directories.

Sandbox Enforcement

Same rules as file-read. The path must resolve within sandboxDir, or a SandboxViolationError is thrown.

Examples

// Write a new file
await tools.useTool('file-write', {
  path: 'output/results.json',
  content: JSON.stringify({ processed: 42, errors: 0 }, null, 2),
});


// Append to a log file
await tools.useTool('file-write', {
  path: 'logs/agent.log',
  content: `[${new Date().toISOString()}] Task completed successfully\n`,
  append: true,
});


// Write binary data from base64
await tools.useTool('file-write', {
  path: 'exports/chart.png',
  content: base64ImageData,
  encoding: 'base64',
});

Tool: shell-exec

Execute shell commands within the sandboxed environment.

ID: shell-exec

Parameters

ParamTypeRequiredDefaultDescription
commandstringYes—Shell command to execute
cwdstringNosandbox rootWorking directory (relative to sandbox)
timeoutnumberNo30000Timeout in ms
envobjectNo—Extra environment variables

Returns

// Successful execution
{
  stdout: 'Hello, world!\n',
  stderr: '',
  exitCode: 0,
  timedOut: false,
  error: null
}


// Non-zero exit (does NOT throw)
{
  stdout: '',
  stderr: 'fatal: not a git repository\n',
  exitCode: 128,
  timedOut: false,
  error: null
}


// Timeout (process killed)
{
  stdout: '... partial output ...',
  stderr: '',
  exitCode: 143,
  timedOut: true,
  error: 'Process timed out after 30000ms'
}

Error Behavior

Non-zero exit codes do not throw. The LLM receives stdout, stderr, and the exit code so it can reason about what went wrong and decide how to proceed. This is intentional — many CLI tools use non-zero exits for non-fatal conditions.

Only sandbox violations throw.

Sandbox Enforcement

The cwd parameter must resolve within the sandbox directory. Attempting to set cwd to a path outside the sandbox throws SandboxViolationError.

// ✓ Valid — runs in {sandboxDir}/project
await tools.useTool('shell-exec', { command: 'ls -la', cwd: 'project' });


// ✗ BLOCKED — traversal detected
await tools.useTool('shell-exec', { command: 'ls', cwd: '../../../' });
// → throws SandboxViolationError

Security Warning

This tool executes arbitrary shell commands and is not a sandbox. Only the starting directory is checked; a command can cd .. and do anything the user running Kernova can. It is off by default. Enable it only for agents whose input you fully trust, ideally inside a container:

builtInTools: { enabled: [...DEFAULT_BUILT_IN_TOOLS, 'shell-exec'], shellTimeout: 10_000 }

What it does enforce:

  • Commands get a minimal environment (PATH, HOME, temp directories and similar). API keys and other secrets in your process environment are not passed through; add what commands need with shellEnv
  • The timeout is a ceiling the model can’t raise, and on timeout the command and every process it started are killed

Examples

// Run a build script
const result = await tools.useTool('shell-exec', {
  command: 'npm run build',
  cwd: 'project',
  timeout: 60000,
});


if (result.exitCode !== 0) {
  console.error('Build failed:', result.stderr);
}
// Run with environment variables
await tools.useTool('shell-exec', {
  command: 'python analyze.py --input data.csv',
  env: { PYTHONPATH: './lib', OUTPUT_FORMAT: 'json' },
  timeout: 45000,
});
// Quick check — list files
const { stdout } = await tools.useTool('shell-exec', {
  command: 'find . -name "*.ts" | head -20',
});

Tool: date-time

Get the current date, time, and timezone information.

ID: date-time

Parameters

ParamTypeRequiredDefaultDescription
formatstringNo'iso'Output format (iso, unix, locale)
timezonestringNosystem TZIANA timezone (e.g., 'America/New_York')

Returns

{
  iso: '2025-07-10T14:30:00-04:00',
  unix: 1720630200,
  unixMs: 1720630200000,
  date: '2025-07-10',
  time: '14:30:00',
  timezone: 'America/New_York',
  offset: '-04:00',
  dayOfWeek: 'Thursday',
}

Why This Exists

LLMs don’t know the current date or time. This tool gives agents temporal awareness without relying on stale training data. Common use cases:

  • Scheduling: “remind me tomorrow at 9am”
  • Logging: timestamp entries
  • Time-zone conversions: “what time is it in Tokyo?”
  • Relative dates: “what day was last Monday?”

Examples

// Get current time in default timezone
const now = await tools.useTool('date-time', {});
console.log(now.iso); // '2025-07-10T14:30:00-04:00'


// Get time in a specific timezone
const tokyo = await tools.useTool('date-time', { timezone: 'Asia/Tokyo' });
console.log(tokyo.time); // '03:30:00' (next day)


// Just need the unix timestamp
const { unix } = await tools.useTool('date-time', { format: 'unix' });

Search the web and return structured results.

ID: web-search

Parameters

ParamTypeRequiredDefaultDescription
querystringYes—Search query
maxResultsnumberNo5Max results to return

Returns

{
  query: 'Kernova AI framework',
  results: [
    {
      title: 'Kernova — Autonomous Agent Framework',
      url: 'https://kernova2026.vercel.app',
      snippet: 'Build, deploy, and manage autonomous AI agents...',
    },
    // ... more results
  ],
  resultCount: 5
}

When no provider is configured:

{
  query: 'Kernova AI framework',
  results: [],
  message: 'No search provider configured'
}

Provider Pattern

Web search needs an API key, so Kernova doesn’t ship a search backend. Until you configure one, web-search isn’t offered to agents at all (so the model never wastes a call on a tool that returns nothing).

To enable it, implement the WebSearchProvider interface and pass it as builtInTools.webSearchProvider:

import { createWebSearchTool, KernovaKernel } from '@kernova/core';
import type { WebSearchProvider, SearchResult } from '@kernova/core';


class BraveSearchProvider implements WebSearchProvider {
  async search(query: string, maxResults: number): Promise<SearchResult[]> {
    const res = await fetch(
      `https://api.search.brave.com/res/v1/web/search?q=${encodeURIComponent(query)}&count=${maxResults}`,
      {
        headers: { 'X-Subscription-Token': process.env.BRAVE_API_KEY! },
      }
    );
    const data = await res.json();
    return data.web.results.map((r: any) => ({
      title: r.title,
      url: r.url,
      snippet: r.description,
    }));
  }
}


// Give it to the kernel's built-in web-search tool
const kernel = new KernovaKernel({
  environment: 'production',
  builtInTools: { webSearchProvider: new BraveSearchProvider() },
});


// Or build a standalone tool for your own plugin
const searchTool = createWebSearchTool(new BraveSearchProvider());

You can use any search API — Brave, SerpAPI, Tavily, or your own. Just implement the interface:

interface WebSearchProvider {
  search(query: string, maxResults: number): Promise<SearchResult[]>;
}


interface SearchResult {
  title: string;
  url: string;
  snippet: string;
}

Example

// Search and summarize results
const { results } = await tools.useTool('web-search', {
  query: 'Node.js 22 new features',
  maxResults: 3,
});


for (const r of results) {
  console.log(`${r.title}: ${r.url}`);
}

Tool: json-parse

Parse raw JSON strings with optional dot-path extraction and transformations.

ID: json-parse

Parameters

ParamTypeRequiredDefaultDescription
inputstringYes—Raw JSON string to parse
pathstringNo—Dot-path to extract (e.g., "data.users[0].name")
transformstringNo—Transform: 'keys', 'values', 'flatten', 'pretty'

Examples

// Parse and extract a nested value
const result = await tools.useTool('json-parse', {
  input: '{"data":{"users":[{"name":"Alice","age":30}]}}',
  path: 'data.users[0].name',
});
// { result: "Alice" }


// Flatten a nested object
const flat = await tools.useTool('json-parse', {
  input: '{"a":{"b":1,"c":{"d":2}}}',
  transform: 'flatten',
});
// { result: { "a.b": 1, "a.c.d": 2 } }


// Get object keys
const keys = await tools.useTool('json-parse', {
  input: '{"name":"Alice","age":30,"role":"admin"}',
  transform: 'keys',
});
// { result: ["name", "age", "role"] }

Tool: math-eval

Safely evaluate mathematical expressions without eval(). Uses a recursive-descent parser.

ID: math-eval

Parameters

ParamTypeRequiredDescription
expressionstringYesMath expression (e.g., "2 * pi + sqrt(16)")

Supported Operations

Arithmetic: +, -, *, /, %, ^ (power) Functions: sqrt, abs, ceil, floor, round, sin, cos, tan, log, log2, log10, min, max Constants: pi, e, random

Examples

const r1 = await tools.useTool('math-eval', { expression: '2 * pi + sqrt(16)' });
// { expression: "2 * pi + sqrt(16)", result: 10.283... }


const r2 = await tools.useTool('math-eval', { expression: 'max(10, 20, 30) * 2' });
// { expression: "max(10, 20, 30) * 2", result: 60 }


const r3 = await tools.useTool('math-eval', { expression: '2^10' });
// { expression: "2^10", result: 1024 }

Tool: regex-match

Pattern matching and replacement. The regex runs in a worker thread that is stopped after 5 seconds, so a catastrophic-backtracking pattern (ReDoS) can’t freeze the process. Results are capped at 10,000 matches.

ID: regex-match

Parameters

ParamTypeRequiredDefaultDescription
textstringYes—Text to search in
patternstringYes—Regex pattern
flagsstringNo''Flags: 'g', 'i', 'gi', 'gm', etc.
replacestringNo—If set, performs replacement instead of matching

Returns

Match mode: { matches: string[], groups: Record<string, string>[], matchCount: number } Replace mode: { result: string, replacements: number }

Examples

// Find all email addresses
const emails = await tools.useTool('regex-match', {
  text: 'Contact alice@example.com or bob@test.org',
  pattern: '[\\w.-]+@[\\w.-]+\\.[a-z]{2,}',
  flags: 'gi',
});
// { matches: ["alice@example.com", "bob@test.org"], groups: [], matchCount: 2 }


// Replace with named groups
const result = await tools.useTool('regex-match', {
  text: '2025-07-10',
  pattern: '(\\d{4})-(\\d{2})-(\\d{2})',
  replace: '$2/$3/$1',
});
// { result: "07/10/2025", replacements: 1 }

Tool: image-describe

Describe images using a vision-capable AI model. Requires a model that supports image input (GPT-4o, Claude 3.5, Gemini).

ID: image-describe

Parameters

ParamTypeRequiredDefaultDescription
urlstringYes—Image URL (https://…) or base64 data URI
promptstringNo"Describe this image in detail"What to focus on

Returns

{ description: string, url: string }

Examples

// Describe a web image
const desc = await tools.useTool('image-describe', {
  url: 'https://example.com/chart.png',
  prompt: 'What trends does this chart show?',
});
// { description: "The chart shows quarterly revenue...", url: "https://..." }


// Describe a base64 image
const result = await tools.useTool('image-describe', {
  url: '...',
  prompt: 'Is there any text visible in this screenshot?',
});

Tool: database-query

Execute read-only SQL queries against a SQLite database you choose. Write operations are rejected.

Off by default. It needs both an entry in enabled and builtInTools.databasePath; there is no default database. Don’t point it at Kernova’s own kernova.db, which holds every user’s memories and events.

ID: database-query

Parameters

ParamTypeRequiredDescription
querystringYesSQL query (SELECT only)
paramsarrayNoParameterized values for ? placeholders

Returns

{ rows: Record<string, unknown>[], rowCount: number, columns: string[] }

Security

Only SELECT, WITH...SELECT, and EXPLAIN queries are allowed. All write operations (INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, DROP, ALTER, CREATE, etc.) are rejected with a clear error message.

Examples

// Simple query
const users = await tools.useTool('database-query', {
  query: 'SELECT name, email FROM users WHERE active = 1 LIMIT 10',
});
// { rows: [{name: "Alice", email: "..."}, ...], rowCount: 5, columns: ["name", "email"] }


// Parameterized query (prevents SQL injection)
const events = await tools.useTool('database-query', {
  query: 'SELECT * FROM events WHERE event_type = ? AND timestamp > ?',
  params: ['intent.completed', '2025-07-01'],
});


// Rejected write attempt
const bad = await tools.useTool('database-query', {
  query: 'DELETE FROM users WHERE id = 1',
});
// { error: true, message: "Only SELECT queries are allowed..." }

Tool: code-eval

Execute JavaScript in an isolated child process with a hard timeout. Off by default.

ID: code-eval

Parameters

ParamTypeRequiredDefaultDescription
codestringYes—JavaScript code to execute. The value of the last expression is returned
timeoutnumberNo5000Execution timeout in ms (capped at codeEvalTimeout)

Returns

{ result: unknown, stdout: string, executionMs: number }. The result is passed through JSON, so functions and other non-JSON values come back as strings.

Isolation

  • The code runs in a fresh JavaScript context with only the language built-ins (JSON, Math, Date, Array, Promise, …) plus a captured console.log/warn/error. No host objects are shared, so there is no way back to Node’s process
  • Promise callbacks count toward the timeout, so an async infinite loop is stopped too
  • The context runs in a separate Node process started with the permission model (no file system, child processes, or worker threads), an empty environment, and a 128 MB heap. The process is killed if it overruns

Network access isn’t restricted by Node’s permission model, so treat code-eval as trusted-input only.

Examples

// Simple computation
const calc = await tools.useTool('code-eval', {
  code: `
    const data = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5];
    const sum = data.reduce((a, b) => a + b, 0);
    const avg = sum / data.length;
    console.log('Average:', avg);
    avg;
  `,
});
// { result: 3, stdout: "Average: 3", executionMs: 2 }


// Data transformation
const transform = await tools.useTool('code-eval', {
  code: `
    const input = [{ name: 'Alice', age: 30 }, { name: 'Bob', age: 25 }];
    const names = input.map(p => p.name);
    JSON.stringify(names);
  `,
});
// { result: '["Alice","Bob"]', stdout: "", executionMs: 1 }


// Timeout protection
const infinite = await tools.useTool('code-eval', {
  code: 'while(true) {}',
  timeout: 1000,
});
// { error: true, message: "Execution timed out", executionMs: 1000 }

Security

The code-eval tool uses Node.js vm.runInNewContext() which provides isolation from the host process. However:

  • It does NOT protect against CPU exhaustion within the timeout window
  • It’s suitable for data transformation, not for running untrusted user code at scale
  • In production, consider disabling it via builtInTools.disabled: ['code-eval']

Sandbox Enforcement

The sandbox is Kernova’s primary defense against filesystem and shell abuse by AI agents. It constrains all file and shell operations to a single directory tree.

How It Works

  1. Resolution: All paths are resolved relative to sandboxDir using path.resolve(sandboxDir, userPath).
  2. Normalization: The resolved path is normalized to remove ., .., and redundant separators.
  3. Containment check: The normalized path must startsWith(sandboxDir). If not → blocked.
// sandboxDir = '/app/data'


resolve('/app/data', 'reports/q4.csv')
  → '/app/data/reports/q4.csv'
  → startsWith('/app/data') ✓ ALLOWED


resolve('/app/data', '../../etc/passwd')
  → '/etc/passwd'
  → startsWith('/app/data') ✗ BLOCKED

SandboxViolationError

When a path fails the containment check, Kernova throws a SandboxViolationError:

import { SandboxViolationError } from '@kernova/core';


try {
  await tools.useTool('file-read', { path: '../../../etc/shadow' });
} catch (err) {
  if (err instanceof SandboxViolationError) {
    console.error(err.code);    // 'SANDBOX_VIOLATION'
    console.error(err.message); // 'Path resolves outside sandbox: /etc/shadow'
  }
}

Which Tools Are Sandboxed?

ToolSandboxedWhat’s Checked
file-readYespath parameter
file-writeYespath parameter
shell-execYescwd parameter
http-fetchNo—
date-timeNo—
web-searchNo—

Using Tools in Agents

Pattern 1: Let the LLM Decide (Automatic)

When an agent has tools available and you don’t provide a custom executor, the default executor calls completeWithTools(). This sends tool definitions to the LLM as part of the prompt, and the LLM decides whether (and which) tools to invoke in a multi-turn loop.

app.agent('researcher', {
  instructions: 'You research topics using web search and HTTP requests.',
  // No custom executor — the default executor uses completeWithTools()
  // which sends tool definitions to the LLM and lets it decide
});


// The LLM will autonomously call web-search and http-fetch as needed
const result = await app.ask('What are the latest changes in TypeScript 5.5?');

This is the most common pattern. The LLM sees the tool descriptions in its context and calls them as part of its reasoning loop.

Pattern 2: Direct Invocation (Custom Executor)

When you need deterministic control over tool usage — specific order, conditional logic, or combining tool results before the LLM sees them — use a custom executor with tools.useTool():

app.agent('file-processor', {
  instructions: 'You process and transform files.',
  async execute(intent, context, tools) {
    // Step 1: Read input
    const { content } = await tools.useTool('file-read', {
      path: 'input.json',
    });


    // Step 2: Let the LLM transform the content
    const processed = await tools.complete(
      `Transform this JSON into a Markdown report:\n\n${content}`
    );


    // Step 3: Write output
    await tools.useTool('file-write', {
      path: 'output/report.md',
      content: processed,
    });


    return {
      success: true,
      summary: 'File processed and report generated',
      data: { inputSize: content.length, outputPath: 'output/report.md' },
    };
  },
});

Pattern 3: Hybrid (LLM + Direct)

You can mix both approaches. Use direct calls for setup/teardown, and let the LLM handle the creative middle:

app.agent('data-analyst', {
  instructions: 'You analyze datasets and produce insights.',
  async execute(intent, context, tools) {
    // Direct: read the data
    const { content } = await tools.useTool('file-read', { path: 'dataset.csv' });


    // LLM with tools: let it search for context and analyze
    const analysis = await tools.completeWithTools(
      `Analyze this dataset and search the web for relevant benchmarks:\n\n${content}`
    );


    // Direct: save results
    await tools.useTool('file-write', {
      path: 'analysis/results.md',
      content: analysis,
    });


    return { success: true, summary: analysis.slice(0, 200) };
  },
});

Enable/Disable Logic

The enable/disable system follows a clear priority order:

Priority Rules

  1. disabled array (highest priority): If a tool ID appears in disabled, it is removed regardless of the enabled array.
  2. enabled array: If set, only tools in this list are available. Everything else is excluded.
  3. Neither set (default): All 6 tools are registered and available.

Examples

// All 6 tools available (default)
builtInTools: {}


// Only 3 tools available
builtInTools: {
  enabled: ['http-fetch', 'date-time', 'file-read'],
}


// All except shell-exec
builtInTools: {
  disabled: ['shell-exec'],
}


// enabled + disabled: disabled wins
// Result: only http-fetch and date-time (file-read is disabled)
builtInTools: {
  enabled: ['http-fetch', 'date-time', 'file-read'],
  disabled: ['file-read'],
}

Decision Flowchart

For each built-in tool:
  ├─ Is it in `disabled`? → SKIP (not registered)
  ├─ Is `enabled` array set?
  │   ├─ Is tool in `enabled`? → REGISTER
  │   └─ Not in `enabled`? → SKIP
  └─ Neither array set? → REGISTER (default: all enabled)

Security Best Practices

1. Disable shell-exec in production

Unless your agent genuinely needs to run shell commands, disable it. The risk of arbitrary command execution far outweighs convenience:

builtInTools: {
  disabled: ['shell-exec'],
}

2. Use the narrowest sandboxDir possible

Don’t set sandboxDir to your home directory or project root. Point it at the specific directory the agent needs access to:

// ✗ Too broad
builtInTools: { sandboxDir: '/home/user' }


// ✓ Narrow and specific
builtInTools: { sandboxDir: '/home/user/app/agent-workspace' }

3. Prefer enabled whitelist over disabled blacklist

Explicit is better than implicit. In production, declare exactly which tools your agent needs:

// ✓ Production: explicit whitelist
builtInTools: {
  enabled: ['http-fetch', 'date-time'],
}


// ✗ Risky: you might forget to disable a new tool in future versions
builtInTools: {
  disabled: ['shell-exec'],
}

4. Monitor tool events

Kernova emits events when tools are used. Monitor them to detect abuse or unexpected behavior:

kernel.events.subscribe('tool.executed', ({ data, correlationId }) => {
  console.log(`[tool] ${data.toolId} ran in ${data.durationMs}ms`);
  if (String(data.toolId).endsWith('shell-exec')) {
    // Keep an audit trail of shell use
    audit.log('shell-exec', correlationId);
  }
});


kernel.events.subscribe('tool.failed', ({ data }) => {
  console.error(`[tool:error] ${data.toolId}: ${data.error}`);
  if (/sandbox/i.test(String(data.error))) {
    // Alert on sandbox violation attempts
    alerts.send('sandbox-violation', data);
  }
});

5. Set reasonable shell timeouts

The default 30-second timeout is sensible for most cases. Don’t increase it to minutes unless you have a very specific reason:

// ✓ Good: tight timeout for quick commands
builtInTools: { shellTimeout: 10000 }


// ✗ Risky: allows long-running processes
builtInTools: { shellTimeout: 300000 }

6. Review agent instructions

Your agent’s system prompt is the first line of defense. Be specific about what the agent should and shouldn’t do with tools:

app.agent('data-fetcher', {
  instructions: `
    You fetch data from approved APIs only.
    NEVER make requests to internal network addresses (10.x, 192.168.x, localhost).
    NEVER write to any path outside the 'output/' directory.
    If a request fails, report the error — do not retry more than twice.
  `,
});

Summary

ToolSandboxedThrows on ErrorDefault EnabledConditional
http-fetchNoNo (returns error object)Yes—
file-readYesYesYes—
file-writeYesYesYes—
shell-execYesNo (returns exit code)Yes—
date-timeNoNoYes—
web-searchNoNo (returns empty)Yes—
json-parseNoNo (returns error object)Yes—
math-evalNoNo (returns error object)Yes—
regex-matchNoNo (returns error object)Yes—
image-describeNoNo (returns error object)YesRequires modelRouter
database-queryNoNo (returns error object)YesRequires databasePath
code-evalVM sandboxNo (returns error object)Yes—

Built-in tools provide a secure, zero-config foundation for agent capabilities. Start with the whitelist approach, keep the sandbox tight, and disable shell-exec and code-eval in production unless you need them.